Improving the reliability of model-based decision-making estimates in the two-stage decision task with reaction-times and drift-diffusion modeling

A well-established notion in cognitive neuroscience proposes that multiple brain systems contribute to choice behaviour. These include: (1) a model-free system that uses values cached from the outcome history of alternative actions, and (2) a model-based system that considers action outcomes and the transition structure of the environment. The widespread use of this distinction, across a range of applications, renders it important to index their distinct influences with high reliability. Here we consider the two-stage task, widely considered as a gold standard measure for the contribution of model-based and model-free systems to human choice. We tested the internal/temporal stability of measures from this task, including those estimated via an established computational model, as well as an extended model using drift-diffusion. Drift-diffusion modeling suggested that both choice in the first stage, and RTs in the second stage, are directly affected by a model-based/free trade-off parameter. Both parameter recovery and the stability of model-based estimates were poor but improved substantially when both choice and RT were used (compared to choice only), and when more trials (than conventionally used in research practice) were included in our analysis. The findings have implications for interpretation of past and future studies based on the use of the two-stage task, as well as for characterising the contribution of model-based processes to choice behaviour

Increased decision thresholds trigger extended information gathering across the compulsivity spectrum

Indecisiveness and doubt are cognitive phenotypes of compulsive disorders, including obsessive-compulsive disorder. Little is known regarding the cognitive mechanisms that drive these behaviours across a compulsivity spectrum. Here, we used a sequential information gathering task to study indecisiveness in subjects with high and low obsessive-compulsive scores. These subjects were selected from a large population-representative database, and matched for intellectual and psychiatric factors. We show that high compulsive subjects sampled more information and performed better when sampling was cost-free. When sampling was costly, both groups adapted flexibly to reduce their information gathering. Computational modelling revealed that increased information gathering behaviour could be explained by higher decision thresholds that, in turn, were driven by a delayed emergence of impatience or urgency. Our findings show that indecisiveness generalises to a compulsivity spectrum beyond frank clinical disorder, and this behaviour can be explained within a decision-theoretic framework as arising from an augmented decision threshold associated with an attenuated urgency signal

Metacognitive impairments extend perceptual decision making weaknesses in compulsivity.

Awareness of one's own abilities is of paramount importance in adaptive decision making. Psychotherapeutic theories assume such metacognitive insight is impaired in compulsivity, though this is supported by scant empirical evidence. In this study, we investigate metacognitive abilities in compulsive participants using computational models, where these enable a segregation between metacognitive and perceptual decision making impairments. We examined twenty low-compulsive and twenty high-compulsive participants, recruited from a large population-based sample, and matched for other psychiatric and cognitive dimensions. Hierarchical computational modelling of the participants' metacognitive abilities on a visual global motion detection paradigm revealed that high-compulsive participants had a reduced metacognitive ability. This impairment was accompanied by a perceptual decision making deficit whereby motion-related evidence was accumulated more slowly in high compulsive participants. Our study shows that the compulsivity spectrum is associated with a reduced ability to monitor one's own performance, over and above any perceptual decision making difficulties

Assigning the right credit to the wrong action: compulsivity in the general population is associated with augmented outcome-irrelevant value-based learning.

Funder: NIHR Senior InvestigatorCompulsive behavior is enacted under a belief that a specific act controls the likelihood of an undesired future event. Compulsive behaviors are widespread in the general population despite having no causal relationship with events they aspire to influence. In the current study, we tested whether there is an increased tendency to assign value to aspects of a task that do not predict an outcome (i.e., outcome-irrelevant learning) among individuals with compulsive tendencies. We studied 514 healthy individuals who completed self-report compulsivity, anxiety, depression, and schizotypal measurements, and a well-established reinforcement-learning task (i.e., the two-step task). As expected, we found a positive relationship between compulsivity and outcome-irrelevant learning. Specifically, individuals who reported having stronger compulsive tendencies (e.g., washing, checking, grooming) also tended to assign value to response keys and stimuli locations that did not predict an outcome. Controlling for overall goal-directed abilities and the co-occurrence of anxious, depressive, or schizotypal tendencies did not impact these associations. These findings indicate that outcome-irrelevant learning processes may contribute to the expression of compulsivity in a general population setting. We highlight the need for future research on the formation of non-veridical action-outcome associations as a factor related to the occurrence and maintenance of compulsive behavior

Credit assignment to state-independent task representations and its relationship with model-based decision making.

Model-free learning enables an agent to make better decisions based on prior experience while representing only minimal knowledge about an environment's structure. It is generally assumed that model-free state representations are based on outcome-relevant features of the environment. Here, we challenge this assumption by providing evidence that a putative model-free system assigns credit to task representations that are irrelevant to an outcome. We examined data from 769 individuals performing a well-described 2-step reward decision task where stimulus identity but not spatial-motor aspects of the task predicted reward. We show that participants assigned value to spatial-motor representations despite it being outcome irrelevant. Strikingly, spatial-motor value associations affected behavior across all outcome-relevant features and stages of the task, consistent with credit assignment to low-level state-independent task representations. Individual difference analyses suggested that the impact of spatial-motor value formation was attenuated for individuals who showed greater deployment of goal-directed (model-based) strategies. Our findings highlight a need for a reconsideration of how model-free representations are formed and regulated according to the structure of the environment

Conservative and disruptive modes of adolescent change in human brain functional connectivity

Adolescent changes in human brain function are not entirely understood. Here, we used multiecho functional MRI (fMRI) to measure developmental change in functional connectivity (FC) of resting-state oscillations between pairs of 330 cortical regions and 16 subcortical regions in 298 healthy adolescents scanned 520 times. Participants were aged 14 to 26 y and were scanned on 1 to 3 occasions at least 6 mo apart. We found 2 distinct modes of age-related change in FC: “conservative” and “disruptive.” Conservative development was characteristic of primary cortex, which was strongly connected at 14 y and became even more connected in the period from 14 to 26 y. Disruptive development was characteristic of association cortex and subcortical regions, where connectivity was remodeled: connections that were weak at 14 y became stronger during adolescence, and connections that were strong at 14 y became weaker. These modes of development were quantified using the maturational index (MI), estimated as Spearman’s correlation between edgewise baseline FC (at 14 y, FC14) and adolescent change in FC (ΔFC14−26), at each region. Disruptive systems (with negative MI) were activated by social cognition and autobiographical memory tasks in prior fMRI data and significantly colocated with prior maps of aerobic glycolysis (AG), AG-related gene expression, postnatal cortical surface expansion, and adolescent shrinkage of cortical thickness. The presence of these 2 modes of development was robust to numerous sensitivity analyses. We conclude that human brain organization is disrupted during adolescence by remodeling of FC between association cortical and subcortical areas

Influence of prior beliefs on perception in early psychosis: Effects of illness stage and hierarchical level of belief.

Alterations in the balance between prior expectations and sensory evidence may account for faulty perceptions and inferences leading to psychosis. However, uncertainties remain about the nature of altered prior expectations and the degree to which they vary with the emergence of psychosis. We explored how expectations arising at two different levels-cognitive and perceptual-influenced processing of sensory information and whether relative influences of higher- and lower-level priors differed across people with prodromal symptoms and those with psychotic illness. In two complementary auditory perception experiments, 91 participants (30 with first-episode psychosis, 29 at clinical risk for psychosis, and 32 controls) were required to decipher a phoneme within ambiguous auditory input. Expectations were generated in two ways: an accompanying visual input of lip movements observed during auditory presentation or through written presentation of a phoneme provided prior to auditory presentation. We determined how these different types of information shaped auditory perceptual experience, how this was altered across the prodromal and established phases of psychosis, and how this relates to cingulate glutamate levels assessed by magnetic resonance spectroscopy. The psychosis group relied more on high-level cognitive priors compared to both healthy controls and those at clinical risk for psychosis and relied more on low-level perceptual priors than the clinical risk group. The risk group was marginally less reliant on low-level perceptual priors than controls. The results are consistent with previous theory that influences of prior expectations in perceptions in psychosis differ according to level of prior and illness phase. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).Wellcome Trus

Personality dimensions emerging during adolescence and young adulthood are underpinned by a single latent trait indexing impairment in social functioning.

BACKGROUND: Personality with stable behavioural traits emerges in the adolescent and young adult years. Models of putatively distinct, but correlated, personality traits have been developed to describe behavioural styles including schizotypal, narcissistic, callous-unemotional, negative emotionality, antisocial and impulsivity traits. These traits have influenced the classification of their related personality disorders. We tested if a bifactor model fits the data better than correlated-factor and orthogonal-factor models and subsequently validated the obtained factors with mental health measures and treatment history. METHOD: A set of self-report questionnaires measuring the above traits together with measures of mental health and service use were collected from a volunteer community sample of adolescents and young adults aged 14 to 25 years (N = 2443). RESULTS: The bifactor model with one general and four specific factors emerged in exploratory analysis, which fit data better than models with correlated or orthogonal factors. The general factor showed high reliability and validity. CONCLUSIONS: The findings suggest that a selected range of putatively distinct personality traits is underpinned by a general latent personality trait that may be interpreted as a severity factor, with higher scores indexing more impairment in social functioning. The results are in line with ICD-11, which suggest an explicit link between personality disorders and compromised interpersonal or social function. The obtained general factor was akin to the overarching dimension of personality functioning (describing one's relation to the self and others) proposed by DSM-5 Section III

Preference uncertainty accounts for developmental effects on susceptibility to peer influence in adolescence.

Adolescents are prone to social influence from peers, with implications for development, both adaptive and maladaptive. Here, using a computer-based paradigm, we replicate a cross-sectional effect of more susceptibility to peer influence in a large dataset of adolescents 14 to 24 years old. Crucially, we extend this finding by adopting a longitudinal perspective, showing that a within-person susceptibility to social influence decreases over a 1.5 year follow-up time period. Exploiting this longitudinal design, we show that susceptibility to social influences at baseline predicts an improvement in peer relations over the follow-up period. Using a Bayesian computational model, we demonstrate that in younger adolescents a greater tendency to adopt others' preferences arises out of a higher uncertainty about their own preferences in the paradigmatic case of delay discounting (a phenomenon called 'preference uncertainty'). This preference uncertainty decreases over time and, in turn, leads to a reduced susceptibility of one's own behaviour to an influence from others. Neuro-developmentally, we show that a measure of myelination within medial prefrontal cortex, estimated at baseline, predicts a developmental decrease in preference uncertainty at follow-up. Thus, using computational and neural evidence, we reveal adaptive mechanisms underpinning susceptibility to social influence during adolescence

Credit assignment to state-independent task representations and its relationship with model-based decision making

Model-free learning enables an agent to make better decisions based on prior experience while representing only minimal knowledge about an environment’s structure. It is generally assumed that model-free state representations are based on outcome-relevant features of the environment. Here, we challenge this assumption by providing evidence that a putative model-free system assigns credit to task representations that are irrelevant to an outcome. We examined data from 769 individuals performing a well-described 2-step reward decision task where stimulus identity but not spatial-motor aspects of the task predicted reward. We show that participants assigned value to spatial-motor representations despite it being outcome irrelevant. Strikingly, spatial-motor value associations affected behavior across all outcome-relevant features and stages of the task, consistent with credit assignment to low-level state-independent task representations. Individual difference analyses suggested that the impact of spatial-motor value formation was attenuated for individuals who showed greater deployment of goal-directed (model-based) strategies. Our findings highlight a need for a reconsideration of how model-free representations are formed and regulated according to the structure of the environment